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publicly denounced the affair and in no very measured terms. Some three or four years afterwards a letter of his, written to the late Judge Hanway in 1878, came to light, in which he said that he never "had much doubt that Captain Brown was the author of the blow at Pottawatomie," because he was the only man who "comprehended the situation . . . and had the nerve to strike it." This letter, eagerly caught up by enemies of Governor Robinson, furnished them a convenient text for uncompromising discourse. His defense was that, when he wrote the letter, he did not know the facts—that he never fully understood the situation until Townsley's narrative was printed. In passing upon the validity of this defense we are to remember that, for reasons not particularly difficult to conjecture, the Free-State folk avoided looking too closely into the Pottawatomie transaction. They by no means neglected border-ruffian outrages; but here was another story in regard to which they, like the Republican members of the Congressional investigating committee of 1856, preferred the bliss of ignorance. Under the circumstances they were quite in the mood to believe that a desperate state of affairs, which demanded the most heroic measures, existed at Dutch Henry's Crossing. Townsley made his statement with reluctance. It was only after repeated and urgent solicitations that he consented to do it. The gentlemen to whom it was dictated—one of them a prominent Kansas lawyer and a well-equipped student of Kansas history—were deeply impressed with his intelligence and sincerity. When this statement, which dissipated the enveloping mass of rumors, surmises and perversions and disclosed the essential facts, was published, not only Governor Robinson but the friends of John Brown as well, changed their attitude in reference to the so-called "executions." The former shifted from apology to denunciation—the latter from negation to defense. In explanation all offer the plea of imperfect information. And we should certainly wish to hear counsel before allowing it in the one case and denying it in the other.

LEVERETT W. SPRING.

Lee at Appomattox and Other Papers. By CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1902. Pp. 387.)

THIS volume is made up of detached papers of very unequal length, not to say of unequal value,—a remark made not for invidious comparison, but only to notice a fact. Where all is good and valuable, discrimination and comparison are not of prime importance.

The title paper—"Lee at Appomattox"—has attracted most attention, but seems to the present writer to be of least value, and is of least length. Still it emphasizes strikingly what is perhaps the wisest act of Lee's career,—the determination, for himself as well as for his army, that the surrender at Appomattox should be the end of the war. It was an essentially bold determination, for Lee was not the commander-in-chief of the Confederate forces, but only the general in command of the army of Northern Virginia. Lee, however, knew his army

was the last reliance and hope of the Confederacy ; and he must have known, too, that nothing but a desultory, irregular struggle could be kept up after his surrender. It is most interesting to know, as Mr. Adams shows, that Lee had maturely considered the issue and had reached his conclusion before the last step must be taken. He had evidently taken thought, too, of a contingency which did not arise, — the refusal of his army to follow his example of surrender. There is true pathos and true heroism of a very high order in these words of Lee to a confidential friend and officer just before the final act: “And as for myself, you young men might go to bushwhacking, but I am too old ; and even if it were right for me to disperse the army, I should surrender myself to General Grant, as the only proper course for one of my years and position.” It is not easy to point to any finer example of poise of character and unselfish obedience to duty in the annals of military or civil life of any age. The scene and the act, the man and the event, put Lee, to use a familiar phrase, in the company of Plutarch’s heroes. It is a good service of Mr. Adams to have set this passage clearly before the world.

By far the longest and most important paper of the volume is entitled “The Treaty of Washington: Before and After.” We say most important because it presents in broad outline and in well-chosen details a very large and influential chapter of our recent history. We think it plain that no other man could have done this so well, from so full and minute knowledge, and in a style at once so trenchant and vivid. The course of English feeling, the sequence and incidents of the diplomacy of England and the United States from 1861 to 1871 are a twice-told tale to Mr. Adams, and into this narrative and review he has put a wealth of personal characterization of the chief actors and of painting of the great scenes and crises of the eventful period, which makes its 220 odd pages fascinating with the liveliest personal and historical interest. It was necessary to review the whole course of events of the ten years which immediately preceded the treaty of Washington in order to put the final transaction in its proper setting. Mr. Adams has taken space to do this. Especially he has not shrunk from passing positive judgments upon actors as well as events. Here he has of course had to meet the usual fortune of critics of individuals. The present writer does not regard it as ground of wise criticism that one who writes of recent events paints men and manners and motives as seems to him justly. Good faith, a fair spirit, is all that can be rightly required. Mr. Adams’s judgments of many individuals have been, and doubtless will be, seriously disputed ; but in our belief no fair charge of intentional misrepresentation will ever lie against the treatment of individuals in this free and outspoken paper. Elsewhere the present writer has expressed his dissent and the reasons therefor from Mr. Adams’s judgment of one large figure on his canvas, but he recognizes not the less that the canvas is a large one and that it has been drawn and filled with much skill and general fidelity to facts.

The treaty itself Mr. Adams regards as the complement of the Emancipation Proclamation, “rounding out,” to quote his words, “and com-

pleting the work of our Civil War." "The verdict of history," he continues, "must then be that the blood and treasure so freely poured out by us between Sumter and Appomattox were not expended in vain; for through it and because of it, the last vestiges of piracy vanished from the ocean, as slavery had before disappeared from the land."

Notwithstanding the length of this paper the treatment of its topic is necessarily succinct and compendious. The ten years covered by it will require for full historical exposition hundreds of pages to each of Mr. Adams's ten. But, as already intimated, this paper will long stand as the best short review of its period and theme. Its value lies especially in the fact that it is largely enriched and illustrated by first-hand investigations and hitherto unpublished material. This refers principally to the private papers of Hamilton Fish to which Mr. Adams has fortunately been given access and from which he has drawn important information. While we see no evidence of undue effort to apotheosize Mr. Fish, yet the result is undoubtedly, so far as this paper goes, to give him a place in the ranks of practical statesmen considerably higher than the general estimation has heretofore given him. To Mr. Fish, to his initiative as well as guidance, to his sound valuation of the situation—its men, especially President Grant, and its background of public opinion both in England and here—to his patience and tenacity in pursuing his clearly defined policy and end, Mr. Adams does full justice; some will feel more than justice, with less than justice to some others. For his implied or inferential, as well as his expressed, estimate of Mr. Fish's statesmanship, there appears to be good grounds. Mr. Fish's achievements as Grant's Secretary of State, especially his conduct of the whole matter of the treaty of Washington and its sequel, the Geneva Arbitration, furnish a striking example of the easy ability with which a great public transaction may be handled by one who may have been, and still be, rated as commonplace or the extreme opposite of brilliant. Mr. Fish's figure in the public eye till 1869 was small, though he had held the highest offices in the gift of the Empire state. He made no set speeches. For diplomacy as a business or as a study it is not known that he cared either during his previous public career or during his subsequent retirement prior to 1869. Yet with all this lack of what is usually regarded as necessary equipment, to which should be added a notable absence of personal ambition, Mr. Adams makes it clear that Mr. Fish was the author and finisher of the whole great work of this treaty from the start in his own parlors at Washington to the conclusion at Geneva. Controversy over him will rage so long as men persist, as Mr. Adams here does, in attacking and depreciating others associated with him; but this ought not to lead to failure to put due estimate on his chief work or to denial of his full title to the rank of a prudent, forceful, and successful statesman in the high field of domestic and foreign diplomacy.

Of the remaining three papers, importance of contents and space at our disposal dictate notice here of but one—the paper entitled "An Undeveloped Function." This paper of 65 pages is, shortly speaking, an

effort to show the low plane on which the discussions of our gravest public questions have hitherto been conducted, and to point out a remedy. Mr. Adams finds it easy, by a swift review of our Presidential canvasses since 1860 to show the correctness of his criticism. He concludes that "taken as a whole, viewed in the gross and perspective, the retrospect leaves much to be desired,"—a summation evidently not open to the criticism often, perhaps not without a degree of justice, made on Mr. Adams of over-statement. Of the whole development of what we often hear called political thought and education in our Presidential canvasses, our author finally declares with more emphasis and more adequacy of characterization: "It has been at best a babel of the commonplace."

To his own query, "Wherein lies the remedy?" Mr. Adams's answer is a singular one; in substance, this: Assemble the American Historical Association, for example, and there in the thick of the canvass, let its members discuss the great present issues of Trusts, Imperialism, etc., and thus make appeal to the real intelligence of the country. It is hardly needful to specify the impassable hindrances to the application of the remedy, or its inefficacy, if otherwise practicable. But Mr. Adams gives us something far wiser and better than his remedy. He himself proceeds to discuss the so-called burning topics of the day—trusts and monopolies, currency, and imperialism. Passing by the discussion of all but the last, it may be said, we think, without exaggeration, that in 20 pages (pp. 316–335) Mr. Adams has presented the soundest, best-reasoned, and most impressive discussion we have yet had of the essential substance of what we now know as imperialism—its source, its motive, its end, its effect, its necessary final result. In these few pages he moves with the steady, firm step of a master, calling in for reproof and instruction the aptest lessons of history and the safest conclusions of philosophy applied to politics or political concerns. The volume would deserve warm and wide welcome if only for this one score of pages.

Mr. Adams as a writer is not to be praised without reserve. Certain literary and moral qualities which are fair topics for criticism, appear in all he writes. Our space would not permit us here to elucidate this remark, if we were disposed to do it. Nor does it temper the heartiness of welcome with which we receive the volume—a volume which in its whole effect adds to our stock of light and wisdom, and everywhere by its free vision and unhampered tone uplifts and cheers those who would know the truth and be guided by it.

D. H. CHAMBERLAIN.

The Life of John Ancrum Winslow, Rear Admiral United States Navy, Who Commanded the "Kearsarge" in her Action with the Confederate Cruiser "Alabama." By JOHN M. ELLICOTT. (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1902. Pp. x, 282.)

THE diligent and painstaking author of this book has done well with his subject. If in certain parts the book seems padded with matters of